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Abstract
We have been studying how students respond to multimodal
logic teaching with Hyperproof. Performance measures have
already indicated that students’ pre-existing cognitive styles
have a significant impact on teaching outcome. Furthermore,
a substantial corpus of proofs has been gathered via automatic
logging of proof development. We report results from ana-
lyses of final proof structure, exploiting (i) ‘proofograms’, a
novel method of proof visualisation, and (ii) corpus-linguistic
bigram analysis of rule use. Results suggest that students’ co-
gnitive styles do indeed influence the structure of their logical
discourse, and that the effect may be attributable to the relative
skill with which students manipulate graphical abstractions.
Introduction: multimodal logical discourse
Computer-based multimodal tools are giving people the free-
dom to express themselves in brand new ways. But what do
people actually do when given these tools? Does everyone
end up generating the same forms of multimodal discourse?
Do multimodal systems lead to better performance than mo-
nomodal systems?
These questions arise in many areas related to human-
computer interaction, but they are particularly important in
educational applications, since multimodality is believed to
be especially helpful to novices (di Sessa 1979, Schwarz and
Dreyfus 1993). Hyperproof is a program created by Bar-
wise and Etchemendy (1994) for teaching first-order logic
(see Figure 1). Inspired by a situation-theoretic approach to
heterogeneous reasoning, it uses multimodal (graphical and
sentential) methods, allowing users to transfer information to
and fro, between modalities (see Figure 2).
We have been carrying out a series of experiments on Hy-
perproof, to help evaluate its effects on students learning logic.
The study has established that there are important individual
differences in the way students respond to logic taught multi-
modally (Cox, Stenning and Oberlander 1994; Stenning, Cox
and Oberlander 1995). In the course of this larger study, we
have built up a substantial corpus of proofs. These ‘hyperpro-
ofs’ are an unusual form of discourse, for two main reasons.
Firstly, they are primarily used for self -communication: a
student arranges proof steps and rules in an external represen-
tation as an aid to their individual problem-solving activities.
Secondly, hyperproofs are, of course, multimodal discourse:
they involve both language and graphics, and are therefore in
some ways more complex than text or speech.
We believe that the corpus of hyperproofs can provide a
detailed insight into the paths which students follow in their
Figure 1: The Hyperproof Interface. The main window (top
left) is divided into an upper graphical pane, and a lower
calculus pane. The tool palette is floating next to the main
window, and other windows can pop up to reveal a set of goals
which have been posed.
Apply Extracts information from a set of sentential premises; ex-
presses it graphically
Assume Introduces a new assumption into a proof, either graphi-
cally or sententially
Observe Extracts information from the situation; expresses it sen-
tentially
Inspect Extracts common information from a set of cases; expres-
ses it sententially
Merge Extracts common information from a set of cases; expresses
it graphically
Close Declares that a sentence is inconsistent with either another
sentence, or the current graphical situation
CTA (Check truth of assumptions) Declares that all sentential and
graphical assumptions are true in the current situation
Exhaust Declares that a part of a proof exhausts all the relevant
cases
Figure 2: A set of relevant Hyperproof rules.
pursuit of proof goals. In this paper, we therefore first frame
some hypotheses concerning the relation between the indivi-
dual differences in teaching outcome which we found, and the
structures to be found in students’ proofs. We then outline
the relevant aspects of the design of the main study, indi-
cating how it distinguishes two styles of student. We then
describe (i) the way ‘proofograms’ are used to track the way
students deal with abstractions; and (ii) the application of bi-
gram and trigram analyses of rule use patterns in the data
corpus, demonstrating that the differing styles of student end
up producing multimodal proofs of distinctive types.
Hypotheses
The observation that graphical systems require certain classes
of information to be specified goes back at least to Bishop Ber-
keley. Elsewhere, we have termed this property ‘specificity’,
and argued that it is useful because inference with specific
representations can be very simple (Stenning and Oberlan-
der 1991, 1995). We have also urged that actual graphical
systems do allow abstractions to be expressed, and it is this
that endows them with a usable level of expressive power.
Thus, Hyperproof maintains a set of abstraction conventions
for objects’ spatial or visual attributes. As well as concrete
depictions of objects, there are ‘graphical abstraction sym-
bols’, which leave attributes under-specified: the cylinder, for
instance, depicts objects of unknown size (see Figure 1). A
key step, then, in mastering an actual graphical system is to
learn which abstractions can be expressed, and how.
As we describe below, our pre-tests independently allowed
us to divide subjects into two cognitive style groups, on the
basis of their performance on a certain type of problem item.
Loosely, one group is ‘good with diagrams’, and the other
less so. The good diagrammers turned out to benefit more
from Hyperproof-based teaching than the others. Our belief
is that those who benefit most from Hyperproof do so because
they are better able to manipulate the graphical abstractions it
offers. Call this view the abstraction ability hypothesis.
A secondary issue concerns the relation between our binary
distinction in cognitive styles and more traditionaldimensions
of individual difference—such as the ‘visualiser–verbaliser’
dimension. One hypothesis is that the good diagrammers are
simply those subjects who have a preference for the visual
modality. Call this view the visual preference hypothesis.
In what follows, we aim to show that the first hypothesis is
vindicated by the analysis, but that the second is not, and that
a rival view might fit the data better.
Method
In the full study, two groups of subjects were compared; one
(   at course end) attended a one-quarter duration course
taught using the multimodal Hyperproof. A comparison group
(  	 at course end) were taught for the same period, but in
the traditional syntactic manner supplemented with exercises
using a graphics-disabled version of Hyperproof.
Distinguishing cognitive styles
Subjects were administered two kinds of pre- and post-course
paper and pencil test of reasoning. The first of these is most
relevant to the current discussion. It tested ‘analytical reaso-
ning’ ability, with two kinds of item derived from the GRE
scale of that name (Duran, Powers and Swinton 1987). One
subscale consists of verbal reasoning/argument analysis. The
other subscale consists of items often best solved by construc-
ting an external representation of some kind (such as a table or
a diagram). We label these subscales as ‘indeterminate’ and
‘determinate’, respectively. Scores on the latter subscale were
used to classify subjects withinboth Hyperproof and Syntactic
groups into DetHi and DetLo sub-groups. The score reflects
subjects’ facility for solving a type of item that often is best
solved using an external representation; DetHi scored well on
these items; DetLo less well. For the moment, we may con-
sider DetHi subjects to be more ‘diagrammatic’, and DetLo
to be less so. Obviously, the relation between diagrammatic
ability and the visualiser–verbaliser dimension is an issue to
which we return below.
Computer-based protocols
Both the Hyperproof and Syntactic groups contained DetHi
and DetLo sub-groups. All subjects sat post-course,
computer-based exams, although the questions differed for
the two groups, since the Syntactic group had not been taught
to use Hyperproof’s systems of graphical rules. Student-
computer interactions were dynamically logged—this ap-
proach might be termed ‘computer-based protocol taking’.
The logs were time stamped and permitted a full, step-by-step,
reconstruction of the time course of the subject’s reasoning.
Here, we discuss only the data from the 22 Hyperproof
subjects, all of whom completed the exams. The four questi-
ons that these students were set contained two types of item:
determinate and indeterminate. Here, determinate problems
were taken to be those whose problem statement did not uti-
lise Hyperproof’s abstraction conventions. That is: determi-
nate problems contained only concrete depictions of objects in
their initiallygiven graphical situation, whereas indeterminate
problems—such as that in Figure 1—could contain graphical
abstraction symbols in the initial situation.
Results
A proof log captures both the process of proof development,
and its product—the final proof submitted by the subject.
Here we discuss the data extracted from the latter.
Proofograms
What evidence is there for the abstraction ability hypothesis?
Among the Hyperproof students, do the two sub-groups—
DetHi and DetLo—use graphical abstraction symbols in cha-
racteristically different ways? To investigate this, we scored
each step of each proof on the basis of number of concrete
situations compatible with the graphical depiction. We give
each graphical symbol in a situation a score: for each visible
attribute (size, shape, and location) a symbol scores 1 if that
attribute is specified, and 0 otherwise. By totalling the scores
for the individual symbols, we can give each situation in a
proof a score. For example, in Figure 3, the total concreteness
score for the situation shown would be 9, since each object is
fully specified; in Figure 5, the score would be just 6, since
one object is specified only for location, and another only for
size and location. A low score indicates more abstraction; a
higher score indicates more concreteness.
We can explore the way concreteness varies through the
course of a proof by graphing it against the hierarchical struc-
Figure 3: Submitted proof for a DetLo subject (C2) attempting
an indeterminate question (Q4). The situation on view is from
the 9th step of the proof.
ture of the proof. We call such graphs ‘proofograms’. Figu-
res 3 and 5 show how subjects C2 and C14 tackle an indeter-
minate exam question; Figures 4 and 6 give their proofograms.
The visual differences between proofograms are quite stri-
king: one group is ‘spikey’—as in Figure 4; and the other
is ‘layered’—as in Figure 6. The differences are most pro-
nounced on the 2 indeterminate exam questions. The visual
grouping of proofograms suggests the existence of a ‘staging
phenomenon’: DetHi introduce concreteness by stages, whe-
reas DetLo introduce it more immediately. In terms of proof
structure, DetHi tend to produce structured sets of cases, with
superordinate cases involving graphical abstraction; DetLo
tend to produce sets of cases without such overt superordinate
structure.
To assess whether this apparent patterning was reliable, the
88 proofograms (4 exam questions for each of the 22 Hy-
perproof subjects) were printed. The proofograms were ran-
domly ordered, and two prototypes (one spikey, one layered)
were selected as category exemplars. Two independent ra-
ters then assigned each proofogram to either the ‘spikey’ or
‘layered’ category, under a forced choice regime. There was
a high degree of inter-rater agreement, with a discrepancy on
only 2 of the 88 proofograms. A third observer was employed
to resolve the two categorisation disagreements.
To test for existence of the staging phenomenon, the con-
cordance between subject type (DetLo/Hi) and proofogram
style was analysed. For each of the 4 exam questions, 2
  2 tables were produced, showing the number of items
in each cell (DetLo/spikey; DetLo/layered; DetHi/spikey;
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Figure 4: Proofogram for C2 attempting Q4. Proof steps are
plotted on the  -axis; the concreteness of the current graphi-
cal situation is computed for each step of the proof, and is
plotted on the  -axis. Horizontal lines indicate dependency
structure; vertical lines indicate uses of Assume; sloping lines
indicate uses of Apply or Merge. C2’s proofogram is ‘spikey’,
indicating a series of independent, concrete cases.
Figure 5: Submitted proof for a DetHi subject (C14) attemp-
ting an indeterminate question (Q4). The situation on view is
from the 9th step of the proof.
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Figure 6: Proofogram for C14 attempting Q4. C14’s proofo-
gram is ‘layered’, indicating parallel sub-case structures with
abstract superordinate cases.
DetHi/layered). A nonparametric measure of association (  
coefficient) was calculated for each table. The results indi-
cated that the hypothesised association only held on indeter-
minate questions (on question 2,      ; on question 4,
 
  ). On questions 1 and 3 (determinate questions), both
raters assigned all proofograms to the spikey category.
It seems, then, that on indeterminate questions, DetHi sub-
jects do differ from DetLo subjects, in that they are more
prone to develop layered proofs, introducing concreteness by
stages. Evidence for the staging phenomenon therefore pro-
vides support for the abstraction ability hypothesis: the two
groups are certainly using abstractions in different ways.
It would, of course, be convenient to be able to encapsu-
late the graphical attributes of the proofogram in numerical
form. Our first attempts to do so have involved computing
mean change in concreteness per proof step per proof. Howe-
ver, the change only exceeds unity on the most indeterminate
exam problem—question 4. In fact, we can consider the fre-
quency with which subjects employ changes in concreteness
of varying magnitude. Figure 7 graphs the differing beha-
viour of the subject groups on question 4. This reinforces
the idea that DetHi subjects tend to make small changes in
concreteness, whereas DetLo subjects make larger changes.
Corpus analysis
Of Hyperproof’s rules, only Assume, Apply and Merge in-
crease concreteness. We therefore examined the kind of pat-
terns in which they occur through proof-corpus analysis. The
proofogram results already indicate that DetHi and DetLo dif-
fer in the way they handle concreteness. Since Assume is by
far the most frequent means of adding concreteness (see, for
instance, Table 3 below), the corpus analysis distinguishes
between uses of the rule which introduce totally concrete gra-
phical situations, and those which leave some abstractness in
the graphic. The term Fullassume denotes the former type of
use, and assume denotes the latter.
Using techniques developed originally for the analysis
of linguistic corpora, we have carried out bigram and tri-
gram analyses of rule use, utilising Dunning’s (1993) ‘Log–
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Figure 7: Frequencies with which DetHi and DetLo subject
groups employ changes in proof concreteness of varying ma-
gnitude, when attempting Question 4. The frequency is nor-
malised to take into account the differing size of the subject
groups (DetHi     , DetLo   
	 ).
Likelihood Test’, which can be applied to relatively small
corpora. The test is designed to “highlight particular A’s and
B’s that are highly associated in text” (p.71). Ranking the
bigrams according to this test provides a good profile of the
individual’s, or the group’s, rule use in the corpus. We can
then compare the profiles for the sub-groups on the two que-
stion types, assessing the significance of a given bigram by
using the  test on the log-likelihood value.
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the nature of the resulting profiles,
and show the most important parts of the bigram profiles for
DetHi and DetLo on indeterminate and determinate questions,
respectively. Taking the profiles for the two groups, we can
consider differences both between-groups and within-groups;
the former are the most interesting.
On indeterminate questions, we find that the bigrams as-
sume Apply, Merge Inspect, CTA Observe, assume Close, Gi-
ven assume, and assume Fullassume are significant in DetHi
proofs, but not in DetLo ones. Conversely, only the bigram
Inspect Merge is significant in DetLo proofs, but not in DetHi
ones. The profiles are weakly but significantly correlated
(  
  ).  When taking into account only those bigrams
that are significantly associated in the profiles, the correlation
is higher, but not significant (      ﬀ ).
On determinate questions, the bigrams assume Apply, CTA
Observeand Close Fullassumeare significant in DetHi proofs,
but not in DetLo ones. Conversely, as with the indeterminate
questions, the only bigram significant in DetLo proofs, but
not in DetHi ones, is Inspect Merge. Here, the two subject
group’s profiles are significantly correlated (  ﬁﬂ ﬃ ).
The correlation between significantly-associated bigrams is
even stronger and still highly significant (  
ﬂ	   ).
This finding accords with the proofograms’ indication that
it is indeterminate questions which best discriminate the two
subject groups. Recall that these are the questions in which the
!
Correlations reported here are non-parametric (Spearman’s " ).
Significance at the #%$'& (*) level is denoted by + ; significance at the
#,$-& ((. level by +/+ .
Table 1: Bigram profiles for subjects’ indeterminate que-
stions: (a) DetHi; (b) DetLo. The first column indicates
Dunning’s ‘log-likelihood’; the higher the number, the more
‘natural’ the association.   is a count of the number
of times the bigram  occurs,  	
 is a count of the
number of times  is followed by a rule other than  , and so
on. For reasons of space, we show only those bigrams that
are significantly associated ( ﬂ ).
DETHI
-2log  k(AB) k(A  B) k(  AB) k(  A  B) A B
145.43 57 22 29 355 Fullassume CTA
123.52 26 13 5 419 Exhaust Merge
78.72 33 85 3 342 assume Apply
69.47 17 11 12 423 Merge Inspect
53.63 39 43 40 341 CTA Fullassume
36.46 2 77 116 268 Fullassume assume
26.16 14 68 7 374 CTA Observe
26.01 12 27 17 407 Exhaust Inspect
25.06 15 103 4 341 assume Close
19.56 17 9 101 336 Given assume
19.55 6 112 73 272 assume Fullassume
DETLO
-2log  k(AB) k(A  B) k(  AB) k(  A  B) A B
134.90 67 33 15 221 Fullassume CTA
78.70 19 13 5 299 Exhaust Inspect
36.75 10 8 11 307 Inspect Merge
34.48 1 99 54 182 Fullassume assume
33.09 45 35 55 201 CTA Fullassume
27.97 11 21 10 294 Exhaust Merge
Table 2: Bigram profiles for subjects’ determinate questions:
(a) DetHi; (b) DetLo. For reasons of space, we again show
only those bigrams that are significantly associated ( ﬂ ).
DETHI
-2log  k(AB) k(A  B) k(  AB) k(  A  B) A B
112.37 24 11 5 366 Exhaust Merge
72.82 48 73 14 271 Fullassume CTA
65.00 15 13 6 372 Merge Inspect
36.39 35 86 17 268 Fullassume Close
26.79 10 16 15 365 Given Apply
26.16 16 36 19 335 Close Exhaust
23.08 11 27 14 354 assume Apply
20.19 32 25 89 260 CTA Fullassume
13.65 10 47 12 337 CTA Observe
10.78 26 26 95 259 Close Fullassume
DETLO
-2log  k(AB) k(A  B) k(  AB) k(  A  B) A B
51.49 13 8 5 207 Exhaust Merge
50.03 28 47 4 154 Fullassume CTA
41.35 10 8 4 211 Given Apply
38.05 9 6 5 213 Merge Inspect
24.93 23 52 9 149 Fullassume Close
19.20 11 21 11 190 Close Exhaust
13.99 4 2 14 213 Inspect Merge
12.59 18 11 57 147 CTA Fullassume
initial graphical situation is abstract, so that all concreteness
must be introduced explicitly by the subjects.
Discussion
The proofogram and corpus analyses provide evidence that
subjects differ in the way that they use the graphical abstrac-
tion conventions of Hyperproof. On questions where the sub-
ject must construct the concrete graphic, it seems that DetHi
subjects exhibit staging behaviour, and build their graphics
incrementally, whereas DetLo subjects are prone to construct
their concrete graphics in one go. The abstraction ability hy-
pothesis thus seems plausible, since the ‘stagers’ are exactly
those whom our main study showed benefit most from tea-
ching with Hyperproof (Stenning,Cox and Oberlander, 1995).
Snow (1987) and colleagues, in their studies of aptitude-
treatment interactions (ATI), characterise such within-person
adaptations and flexibilities as an important source of indivi-
dual differences in complex skill performance. Snow (1987)
reports that subjects’ ability to ‘strategy-shift’ is particularly
detectable on tests of complex spatial visualization such as
the paper-folding test (Test VZ2 in Ekstrom, French and Har-
mon, 1976). Such tests involve mental manipulations that are
very similar to those required for skilled use of a multimodal
system such as Hyperproof.
However, to characterise the difference between subjects
solely in terms of visuo-spatial ability differences—or in terms
of cognitive style differences along a ‘visualiser–verbaliser’
dimension—may be too hasty. To be sure, the visual prefe-
rence hypothesis has some initial plausibility: if the DetHi are
‘good with diagrams’, perhaps they are simply the visualisers,
and have a preference for the visual modality. However, the
evidence from the corpus goes against the hypothesis.
First, consider the way that use of assume and Fullassume
varies between the DetHi and DetLo groups, as shown in Ta-
ble 3. DetHi make more use of assume than DetLo, while
the latter make more use of Fullassume than the former. The
bigram assume Fullassume is found to be significant in DetHi
indeterminate proofs, but not in DetLo proofs. However, these
facts do not support the hypothesis that DetHi prefer visual
over verbal. On the contrary, DetLo subjects’ favouring of
Fullassume over assume confirms that they are not ‘stagers’:
in a sense, it is they who exhibit a preference for the graphical
modality. By contrast, DetHi subjects’ use of assume indica-
tes gradual addition of information to the graphical window
pane, either by assumption, or by transfer from the sentential
pane (via Apply). The difference seems to be that the DetHi
group operate over the graphical situations, frequently using
a graphic as input to further stages of proof construction. The
DetLo, on the other hand, seem just to output graphics, with-
out subsequently using them.
Table 3: Occurrences of Assume, Apply, and Observe.
RULE frequency per group frequency per subject
DetHi DetLo DetHi DetLo
assume 143 62 11 6.9
Fullassume 222 186 17 20.7
Apply 61 24 4.7 2.7
Observe 27 9 2.1 1
In addition,Table 3 indicates that DetHi subjects make more
use of rules that transfer information between the modalities.
DetHi make the bigram assumeApply a significant component
of all their proofs, and use it more frequently than DetLo: 44
times to just 7. By contrast, DetLo exhibit a tendency to
invoke Apply as the first rule in their proofs (giving rise to
the bigram Given Apply). Subsequent interaction between the
modalities is thereby reduced, with case construction being
performed only within the graphical window.
Thus, DetHi subjects do not show a simple preference for
the visual–graphical modality. Rather, what distinguishes the
DetHi subjects is their greater tendency to translate between
graphical and sentential modalities in both directions.
Perhaps, as Monaghan (1995) has suggested, the indivi-
dual differences between subjects might be better captured
by two or more cognitive style dimensions. There may, for
example, be an interaction between individuals’ processing
style and the preferences that they may exhibit for informa-
tion representation. One promising candidate for the second
factor is the field-dependence and field-independence dimen-
sion. Field-independent individuals have been found to prefer
more formal methods of instruction, to rely more upon inter-
nal frames of reference, and to perform better on tasks that
require cognitive re-structuring. They also seem better able
than field-dependents to represent concepts analytically rather
than taking on ideas as presented (Jonassen and Grabowski,
1993; Witkin and Goodenough, 1981). So, DetHi individu-
als might well be more field independent—but we should not
immediately conclude that the differences are purely repre-
sentational, as opposed to operational.
Another possibility is that DetHi subjects may just have
higher levels of expertise. Research in the physics domain
(such as Chi, Feltovich and Glaser, 1981; Larkin, McDer-
mott, Simon and Simon, 1980) has shown that expertise is
characterised by greater domain knowledge, with an ability
to classify problems according to deep structure and physical
principles, whereas novices tend to classify problems on the
basis of surface features. Experts also tend to spend more
time than novices on analysing and understanding problems,
but produce faster solutions. Working forward is typical of
experts, whereas novices tend to work backwards.
An account of the differences in terms of expertise seems
implausible, however, for at least two reasons. First, subjects
in both groups received equal exposure to Hyperproof and it
is difficult to see how the DetHi could have acquired more
domain knowledge than the DetLo. Secondly, the expertise
literature would predict that DetHi produce faster solutions.
However, the two groups did not differ significantly in terms of
solution times on any of the four Hyperproof exam questions.
Traditional psychometric approaches to the measurement
of cognitive and learning styles contribute detailed and useful
characterisation of human behaviour, but at the level of de-
scription and taxonomy. Micro-analyses of process, of rule
usage patterns, is a methodology that promises to extend such
accounts and is one that we expect to pursue. The next phase
will involve the building of computational models, testing the
theoretically important parameter of abstraction ability. This
approach should make a useful contribution to the develop-
ment of a cognitive characterisation of just what it means in
computational terms to be a ‘verbal’ or ‘visual’ thinker.
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